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Though executive privilege is not explicitly mentioned in the U.S. Constitution, 
presidents beginning with George Washington have asserted the right to withhold information 
from Congress and to prevent executive branch officials from testifying before congressional 
committees. While the privilege can be invoked against “those who have compulsory power”1 
generally, in the majority of cases presidents use it in response to congressional inquiries. The 
two bases commonly cited for executive privilege are the presidential communications privilege, 
which derives from the separation of powers doctrine and protects deliberations between the 
president and other executive branch officials and those among presidential advisers, and the 
deliberative process privilege, which derives from common law and applies to any member of 
the executive branch.  
For a long time, Congress was hesitant to seek a court ruling on executive privilege, and 
it was not until United States v. Nixon (1974) that the Supreme Court addressed the issue. The 
Court recognized the constitutional validity of executive privilege but emphasized that it was a 
qualified privilege that had to be balanced with the Congressional power of conducting 
investigations. The Court ultimately rejected Nixon’s claim to it in that case. Although the 
Court’s recognition of executive privilege as valid gave it increased legitimacy, its attempted use 
in two presidential scandals—the Watergate scandal and the Lewinsky scandal—has made 
modern presidents hesitant to formally invoke it. Nevertheless, every president since Nixon has 
sought to use the privilege at least once. 
                                                
1 “Trump and the Parameters of Executive Privilege,” NPR, 
https://www.npr.org/2018/03/03/590616771/trump-and-the-parameters-of-executive-privilege 





Because executive privilege is not outlined in the Constitution and there are no clear-cut 
rules that govern its use, claims of executive privilege often result in a clash between legislative 
and executive interests. Presidents frequently receive pushback when they invoke executive 
privilege—but not always. Some cases of executive privilege go to court; some are resolved by 
compromise, and some are not challenged at all. Sometimes the president succeeds in keeping 
the information from Congress, and sometimes he does not. What makes the difference? Can we 
capture it with the same explanations of presidential success as those established for legislative 
endeavors, or are other factors at play here? This project applies standards of presidential success 
in legislation to presidential use of executive privilege, in addition to examining several factors 
unique to cases of the privilege, and aims to explain why some attempted uses of executive 
privilege are successful whereas others are not. 
 
II. Background on Executive Privilege 
 
Arguments Against Executive Privilege 
 The foremost complaint lodged against executive privilege is that it is not explicitly 
outlined in the Constitution. This leads critics who use a strict interpretation of the Constitution, 
such as Raoul Berger, to believe that the constitutional basis for executive privilege is a “myth.” 
However, most scholars reject this reasoning; Rozell (2010, 9) argues that both presidents and 
Congress have always exercised powers that are not explicitly provided for in the Constitution, 
and that in order for this critique to be legitimate, critics must demonstrate that the Framers 
clearly intended that the power not be exercised and created impediments to its use. 
 Another common argument against the use of executive privilege is that it is not 
compatible with the democratic ideal of open government. Critics argue that our democracy 
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cannot function properly unless Congress and the public have access to information about the 
executive branch’s actions. According to Miroff (1989, 157), “Secret action . . . permits a 
president to persist in a course of policy even if that policy lacks support from, or is strongly 
opposed by, majorities in Congress and among the American people. . . .” Other evidence cited 
by critics that executive privilege is against the principles of our democracy is that it is 
incompatible with the First Amendment right to freedom of the press and that it conflicts with 
the Freedom of Information Act (see Freedom of Information Act section below). Wise (1973, 
149-50) believes that the right to free press cannot be qualified, even in the case of national 
security concerns, because “a democratic system requires a public informed about the decisions 
and actions of its political leaders.” 
 Lastly, critics of executive privilege argue that it is commonly used to cover up 
wrongdoing. Indeed, executive privilege has been involved in the cover-up of several scandals; 
President Nixon attempted to invoke it to conceal his wrongdoing during the Watergate scandal, 
and President Clinton tried to use it to hide his misdeeds in the Lewinsky scandal. Some critics 
argue that the evil that results from the misuse of the privilege is worse than any potential evil 
from releasing sensitive information, and therefore it ought not to be used (Rozell 2010, 18). 
Berger (1974, 26-27) articulates this argument: “Against the debatable assumption that fear of 
disclosure to Congress may inhibit ‘candid interchange’ there is the proven fact that such 
exchanges have time and time again served as vehicles of corruption and malversation.” 
 
Arguments in Favor of Executive Privilege 
 The primary argument in favor of executive privilege is that it is a power necessary for 





his advisers. William Rehnquist once said, “While reasonable men may dispute the propriety of 
particular invocations of executive privilege . . .  I think most would agree that the doctrine itself 
is an absolutely essential condition for the faithful discharge by the executive of his 
constitutional duties” (U.S. Congress 1971, 424). In fact, according to Rozell, executive privilege 
is an even more vital tool today than it was when the Framers wrote the Constitution. He says 
that “the importance of secrecy, unity, and dispatch to governing . . . is even more compelling 
than it was over two centuries ago. Many, if not most, of the crises faced by modern 
governments cannot be dealt with through open, lengthy national deliberations” (2010, 44-45). 
He argues that the Framers recognized that the president is more suited to respond to crisis 
situations than Congress because he is only one person, and thus there are institutional 
capabilities attached to the presidency that allow him to do so. The courts “have recognized the 
executive’s preeminence in national security and foreign policy making on a number of 
occasions,” (Rozell 2010, 45), which gives legitimacy to executive privilege at least insofar as it 
is necessary to preserve national security. 
 Another case made for executive privilege is that it provides a check on Congress’s 
power of inquiry. The power of inquiry is not outlined in the Constitution, but Albert (1974, 
1361) says that the references to impeachment in the Constitution imply a legislative power of 
inquiry into wrongdoing. While some argue that Congress should have absolute power of 
inquiry, according to proponents of executive privilege such as Rozell (2010, 50), this view is 
wrong. He says that “there are inherent institutional limits on the powers of the respective 
government branches” (2010, 50). Rozell (2010, 50) also points out that “it is ironic that Berger 
maintains that executive privilege lacks validity because it is not specifically granted by the 
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Constitution and then argues that Congress possesses an absolute, unlimited inquiry power 




According to Cox (1974, 1435), “History gives no affirmative support to presidential 
claims of privilege to withhold information from the House of Representatives while it is 
considering impeachment.” Whereas neither the legislative power of inquiry nor the right of the 
executive to withhold information appears in the Constitution, the right of Congress to impeach 
is outlined in Article II, Section 4. According to a House report, “The House has the sole right of 
impeachment . . . a power which implies the right of inquiry on the part of the House to the 
fullest and most unlimited extent” (U.S. Congress 1843). Additionally, the Supreme Court ruled 
in United States v. Nixon (1974) that “the impediment that an absolute, unqualified privilege 
would place in the way of the primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch to do justice in 
criminal prosecutions would plainly conflict with the function of the courts under Art. III.”  
 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
Although FOIA provides for transparency in government, Exemption 5 protects “inter-
agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party 
other than an agency in litigation with the agency” (FOIA 2006). The D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals has ruled that this “incorporates all civil discovery rules into FOIA” (Martin v. Office of 
Special Counsel 1987). Executive privilege is one of the “primary, most frequently invoked 
privileges that have been held to be incorporated into Exemption 5” (United States Department 





for a document to be released under FOIA, it would have to be a document that would be 
routinely released in civil litigation (USDOJ 2014, 358). Thus, the privilege is absolute in FOIA 
cases and cannot be overcome by a showing of need. 
 
III. Literature Review 
 
Presidential Success 
 There is an abundance of literature on presidential success in legislation that will inform 
the research in this study. When analyzing presidential success, researchers often aim to explain 
whether success is more affected by presidency-centered or Congress-centered (also referred to 
as contextually-oriented) variables. In other words, can presidents affect their own success, or 
does it depend solely on institutional factors? 
 In the 1990s the general consensus among researchers was that presidential skills “did not 
play very much into the equation” of presidential success in legislation (Catt 2013, 2). Edwards 
(1989) uses box scores to measure congressional support for presidents’ policies from 1953 to 
1986. He concludes that the majority of policy outcomes can be explained by party and ideology 
in Congress and that presidential skills have only a marginal effect. Bond and Fleisher (1990) use 
the “Congress-centered model” to explain presidential success in legislation and achieve similar 
results. They find that the party and ideological makeup of Congress consistently affects 
presidential success, whereas presidential legislative skills do not have a significant effect. They 
use these results to posit that presidential success is primarily a function of congressional 
environment and that there is little that individual presidents can do to affect their rates of 
success. However, they note that they “would like to have a more precise and reliable measure of 
presidential leadership skill” (1990, 218). 
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Since then, some scholars have shown that presidents can significantly contribute to their 
success. Beckmann (2010, 142) finds that a president can increase his success rate by 34 
percentage points by lobbying for his policy positions. Rudalevige (2002, 149) finds that 
presidents can increase their chances of achieving their objectives by 14 percent by developing 
policy in a decentralized manner. Covington, Wrighton, and Kinney (2002) develop a more 
precise measure of presidential skill in their “presidency-augmented model” to explain 
presidential success in roll call voting. They expand on the Congress-centered model and make 
two modifications: (1) when examining roll call votes, they measure whether the bill was 
supported by the president, and (2) they designate congressional leaders as “mediators between 
Congress and the president who provide presidents an indirect means of affecting voting 
outcomes” (2002, 1003). With this broader definition of presidential influence, they find that 
presidents’ skills affect their success in roll call voting. However, the study also confirms the 
finding from Edwards (1989) and Bond and Fleisher (1990) that party and ideological 
differences in Congress strongly affect presidential success. 
Numerous studies have shown that the presence of the president’s party in Congress has 
an effect on presidential success. This holds true regardless of how success is measured or how 
the party is operationalized (Catt 2013, 36). Studies have used diverse methods of 
operationalizing the party variable, such as the percentage of Congress that is of the same party 
as the president (Barrett and Esbaugh-Soha 2007; Canes-Wrone and De Marchi 2002; 
Rudalevige 2002), divided government (Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 1997; McCarty 1997), and 
unified government (Canes-Wrone 2001; Ostrom and Simon 1985). 
Several studies have analyzed the effect of timing on presidential success. A few studies 





defined as the first 12 months in office. Eshbaugh-Soha (2010, 718 & 720) finds that the 
honeymoon effect increases a president’s chance of legislative success by 9 percent overall, with 
a 15 percent boost for major laws and no change for minor laws. Lockerbie, Borrelli, and Hedger 
(1998, 167) conclude that the president is 9.5 percent more likely to succeed during his first year. 
However, a few studies that define the honeymoon period as the first two years of a president’s 
term (Beckmann 2010; Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 1997) find that the honeymoon period has 
no effect on the success of legislation. No studies have shown that it has a negative impact on 
success (Catt 2013, 45). Two studies (Barrett and Esbaugh-Soha 2007; Beckmann 2010) have 
also examined the effect of the lame duck period, which was defined as the president’s last two 
years in office. However, neither has found that it had a significant effect. 
Some studies (Ostrom and Simon 1985; Rivers and Rose 1985) have found that the 
greater the size of a president’s agenda, the less likely he is to be successful. However, the effect 
is relatively small. Ostrom and Simon (1985) find that for every 100 additional items on the 
president’s agenda, his chances of success decrease by 1.8 percentage points.  
The body of literature on presidential success in legislation will contribute to this study 
by providing a framework for analyzing presidential success in the area of executive privilege. 
One presidency-centered variable—previous uses of executive privilege—will be considered, in 
addition to several contextually-oriented variables—party, honeymoon period, and the existence 
of a national security threat. 
 
Executive Privilege 
The existing literature on executive privilege is primarily concerned with evaluating its 
legitimacy. Berger (1965) steadfastly holds that there is no valid justification for the privilege. 
He analyzes the history of the United States government and the British Parliament, as well as 
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the ideas of influential thinkers such as Baron de Montesquieu. He asserts that the U.S. system of 
government as outlined in the Constitution was modeled after Parliament, and therefore 
Congress is the “grand inquest” of the nation (1965, 1058-1060). In his view, Congress’s right to 
information is absolute. Berger (1965, 1060) determines from studying Montesquieu that 
“history delineates a virtually unlimited legislative power to demand information from the 
executive branch.” From his strict reading of the Constitution, he concludes that executive 
privilege has no constitutional basis because it is not what the Framers intended. 
Mark Rozell (2010) argues in favor of executive privilege. He provides an expansive 
overview of the history of its use and refutes many of Berger’s arguments, calling his strict 
interpretation of the Constitution “not credible” (2010, 25). He points out that Article III contains 
many general descriptions of power, and presidents have historically exercised a number of 
powers that are not enumerated in the Constitution (2010, 25). Rozell (2010, 1) proposes that 
“the resolution to the dilemma of executive branch secrecy and democratic accountability is in 
the founders’ theory of the separation of powers. That theory allows for a carefully exercised and 
properly constrained presidential power of executive privilege.” 
Although this study will not make any conclusions about whether executive privilege is 
legitimate, the literature on executive privilege contributed to my understanding of the 
controversy around the privilege, and it led to the inclusion of several other variables that are not 
found in studies of presidential success in legislation. 
The literature on executive privilege points to the idea that presidents will be more 
successful when a claim of executive privilege involves a threat to national security. Rozell 
(2010, 4) says that “the presumption in favor of executive privilege has always been strongest in 





discretionary authority to the president in national security and foreign affairs” (Rozell 2010, 
46), and in United States v. Nixon (1974), the Supreme Court acknowledged the president’s 
“need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets,” which comes from 
Article II of the Constitution. 
The literature also suggests that contempt of Congress proceedings affect executive 
privilege outcomes. According to Rozell (2010, 200), “presidential history is replete with 
examples of chief executives who tried to invoke privilege or threatened to do so, only to back 
down in the face of congressional challenges.” Chafetz (2011, 1084) says that “the legislative 
contempt power has played . . . a key role in resolving contested questions of the allocation of 
power within the federal government.” 
 While the bodies of literature for both executive privilege and presidential legislative 
success are expansive, there have not been any studies that have merged the two. In doing that, 
this study will provide a better understanding of presidential success in areas other than 
legislation as well as provide a more quantitative approach to the questions examined in the 
literature on executive privilege. 
 
IV. Theory and Hypotheses 
 
The question of whether presidents can affect their own success is interesting in its own 
right, and it is particularly worth examining as it relates to executive privilege. Executive 
privilege cases are similar to legislation in that they both involve relations between the president 
and Congress, but it is unlikely that presidential success in executive privilege will be completely 
captured by the determinants of success in legislation. Whereas legislation is contentious because 
of differing ideological beliefs about the content of the laws, executive privilege is controversial 
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in itself. It is widely used, and the Supreme Court has recognized its validity, yet many still hold 
that it should not exist. The determinants of success in executive privilege cases can tell us more 
about what determines success under a different set of conditions; whereas the president’s role in 
enacting legislation is indisputable, his right to use executive privilege is much less certain. 
Moreover, examining the determinants of success in executive privilege can contribute to 
our knowledge of how the balance of powers plays out in our democracy and to test whether it is 
functioning as the Framers intended. Additionally, knowledge of the variables that contribute to 
presidential success in executive privilege will allow us to hold current presidents and members 
of Congress more accountable for their roles in executive privilege. This is because once we 
know the determinants of success, we will know whether success is more dependent on 
legitimate democratic principles such as balance of powers and constitutionally-granted abilities 
or whether one side has much more power than the other in affecting the outcomes.   
The president’s party in relation to the party composition of Congress has been widely 
documented as having an affect on presidential legislative success. I predict that party will also 
have an effect in cases of executive privilege. I hypothesize that presidents will be more 
successful when there is a higher percentage of Congress of the same political party and less 
successful when there is a lower percentage of the same political party. This is because members 
of the same party would likely want the president to succeed and would therefore opt to take no 
action or a less harsh action in response to the use of executive privilege. Furthermore, party 
could play a role when there is a vote on whether to hold an official in contempt of Congress. 
Independently of whether Congress threatens to do this, party could affect whether or not the 
president chooses to back down on his claim. If a higher percentage of Congress is of the same 





being held in contempt of Congress and will therefore be less likely to back down and more 
likely to succeed. 
Eshbaugh-Soha’s (2010) finding that honeymoon periods have a bigger effect on 
presidential success for major laws suggests that honeymoon periods would have an effect in 
cases of executive privilege because they tend to be high-profile and concern important 
information, which makes them more similar to major laws than minor ones. I predict that the 
honeymoon will affect a president’s chances of success in cases of executive privilege. I theorize 
that Congress will be more supportive of the president during his first year and that fresh-faced 
presidents will be seen as more trustworthy than presidents who are later in their tenure, and thus 
Congress will be more likely allow their claims of executive privilege to stand. Therefore, I 
hypothesize that presidential claims of executive privilege will be more successful during the 
honeymoon period. 
I predict that the number of times a president has previously used executive privilege will 
have an effect on his likelihood of success. There is some similar evidence in the literature on 
presidential success; Rivers and Rose (1985) find that the greater the size of a president’s 
agenda, the less likely he is to be successful. I predict that the number of executive privilege 
claims during a presidency will follow a similar pattern. Additionally, people tend to be skeptical 
of the use of executive privilege, and it is likely that if a president uses it too many times, people 
will find it suspicious. Therefore, I hypothesize that the greater the number of times a president 
has previously invoked executive privilege, the less likely he is to be successful. 
I theorize that whether or not a claim of executive privilege involves national security 
interests will strongly affect success. This is because people—both members of government and 
the public—seem more willing to accept a lack of transparency in government when they feel 
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that national security is at stake. Additionally, the courts have acknowledged that presidents 
ought to have more authority when it comes to national security and foreign policy. In Zemel v. 
Rusk (1965) the Supreme Court ruled that “Congress—in giving the president authority over 
matters of foreign affairs—must of necessity paint with a brush broader than that it customarily 
wields in domestic affairs” (Zemel v. Rusk, 1965). In addition, the Supreme Court has 
recognized national security as a compelling reason for invoking the privilege, giving added 
legitimacy to those claims. In United States v. Reynolds (1953, 418), the Court held that “it may 
be possible to satisfy the court . . . that there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the 
evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be 
divulged. When this is the case, the occasion for the privilege is appropriate. . . .” I hypothesize 
that cases of executive privilege that involve national security will be more successful than cases 
that do not. 
The literature on executive privilege points to the idea that presidents often back down 
when faced with pushback from Congress, and a primary way that Congress pushes back is by 
pursuing contempt of Congress citations against executive branch officials. I predict that 
presidents will want to avoid a drawn-out dispute with Congress wherever possible because it 
would likely cause the public to have more negative views of the president and because it would 
make it more difficult for the president to accomplish his legislative goals. Therefore, I 
hypothesize that presidents will be less successful in cases in which Congress pursues a contempt 










 There is no consensus on what constitutes a presidential claim of executive privilege. 
While most cases are clear-cut, there is disagreement over whether some cases constitute formal 
claims of executive privilege. For example, the issue of executive privilege was raised but the 
privilege was not not formally invoked by President Clinton during the Senate Whitewater 
investigation in 1995. Therefore, different sources define executive privilege claims differently. 
The cases used in this research were selected from a Congressional Research Service report for 
Congress, Presidential Claims of Executive Privilege: History, Law, Practice, and Recent 
Developments (Garvey 2014). The only claims outlined in this report that were omitted from this 
research are the ones in which a member of the executive branch acted without direction from 
the president. The report lists cases only from the Kennedy administration through the Obama 
administration. This will make for more accurate and interesting results than examining all 
claims since 1789 because there is little information available about executive privilege claims 
prior to the ones used in this study. 
 
Dependent Variable 
 There are varying definitions of presidential success in legislation in the literature. Some, 
such as the presidential box score, measure only the percentage of legislative proposals in a year 
that are approved by Congress. Others, such as support scores and NOMINATE scores, take into 
account support for a president’s initiatives and presidential influence. For the purposes of this 
study, success will be defined more similarly to the presidential box score; it will concern only 
concrete success, not softer forms such as presidential influence. Success in executive privilege 
will be defined in terms of the amount of information in a given executive privilege claim that 
was not released to Congress or the public. Outcomes will be divided into three categories: 
successful, somewhat successful, and unsuccessful. Successful cases will be defined as those in 
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which the president was able to prevent the release of all of the information in question. 
Somewhat successful cases will be those in which the president was able to keep some but not all 
of the information private. Unsuccessful cases will be those in which all of the information in 
question was released. 
 Information on the outcome of each case was first obtained from Presidential Claims of 
Executive Privilege: History, Law, Practice, and Recent Developments (Garvey 2014). However, 
this report offered only brief summaries of the claims, and for most cases, it did not give the 
outcome. For those cases, the information was found in Executive Privilege: Power, Secrecy, 
and Accountability (Rozell 2010). However, because this book was published in 2010, 
information about the outcome of President Obama’s use of executive privilege was not 
available; this was found in the newspaper article “Obama Relents in Fight Over Fast and 
Furious Documents.”2 
 
Independent Variables  
Party Composition of Congress. Party will be operationalized as the percentage of the relevant 
chamber of Congress that was of the same political party as the president. The variable will be 
discrete instead of continuous; it will be divided into two categories, Majority and Minority. This 
is because studies have found that the party controlling Congress has power regardless of the size 
of their control (Cox and McCubbins 2005). For cases in which the numbers changed between 
the time the case was invoked from the time it was decided, the numbers from the invocation 
date were used. This is to maintain consistency because the decision date was not available or 
                                                






applicable for all cases. This data was retrieved from House.gov (House.gov 2017) and 
Senate.gov (Senate.gov 2017). 
  
Honeymoon Period. Studies have differed on how to handle issues with honeymoon periods, 
such as second terms and presidents who come into office without being elected. Some 
(Lockerbie, Borrelli, and Hedger 1998; Esbaugh-Soha 2006) define the honeymoon period as a 
president’s first year in office. However, others (Beckmann 2010; Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 
1997; Eshbaugh-Soha 2010) find that honeymoon periods are associated with elections. For this 
study, the honeymoon period will be defined as the first year in office after winning an election. 
Therefore, presidents who serve two terms will have two honeymoon periods, and President Ford 
will not have a honeymoon period because he assumed office without being elected. 
  
Previous Uses of Executive Privilege. The number of previous uses of executive privilege for 
each president was found in Presidential Claims of Executive Privilege: History, Law, Practice, 
and Recent Developments  (Garvey 2014). The variable was then divided into three categories: 0 
previous uses, 1-3 previous uses, and 4 or more previous uses. 
 
National Security.  As noted by Rozell (2010, 47), “merely uttering the words national security 
does not in itself justify a claim of executive privilege. The threat to national security must be 
real.” Thus, the president’s word alone cannot determine whether a case involves national 
security. For the purposes of this study, whether or not national security is at play will be 
determined by the stated purpose for using executive privilege by the president or another 
member of the executive branch if it is allowed to stand, or by a court’s findings if it determines 
the claim of national security to be not credible. This information was found in Executive 
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Privilege: Presidential Power, Secrecy, and Accountability and from court cases, where 
applicable. 
 
Contempt of Congress. The information on whether or not Congress pursued a contempt citation 
was found in Presidential Claims of Executive Privilege: History, Law, Practice, and Recent 
Developments (Garvey 2014) and in Executive Privilege: Presidential Power, Secrecy, and 
Accountability (Rozell 2010). Cases that went to court were excluded from this variable because 
it is assumed that the court proceedings replaced the need for Congress to seek a contempt 
citation. Cases in which Congress only threatened to pursue a contempt citation were treated the 
same as cases in which they followed through because according to Rozell (2010, 200), it is not 
only the exercise of congressional powers that matters, “but the threat that Congress may resort 
to such measures.” 
 
VI. Data and Analysis 
 In order to examine the effects of party in Congress on presidential success in executive 
privilege, I cross-tabulated the two variables. The null hypothesis is that the presence of a 
president’s party in Congress has no effect on his success in executive privilege cases. I used 
Fisher’s exact test to determine the statistical significance of the relationship because the cell 






































Table 1: Cross-tabulation on presidential success by party in Congress 
 
The result, p = 1.000, revealed that there is no relationship between the two variables; 
therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis. There are several factors that might explain why 
party did not have the expected effect. First, it might be that ideology about the use of executive 
privilege—rather than party—determines a congressperson’s attitude toward a particular claim of 
executive privilege. Congress typically seems to be unified in its request for information in order 
to perform an investigation; it seems that the more likely split than Democrat versus Republican 
is legislative branch versus executive branch. Additionally, because a lack of presidential success 
in executive privilege will not have the same substantive policy results that a lack of success in 
legislation will, it seems probable that members of Congress will not be as likely to vote along 
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party lines. Although they might have some inclination to do this because of loyalty to their 
party, they might be more concerned with making their own branch of government seem more 
successful.  
 To test whether or not the honeymoon period has an effect on success, I cross-tabulated 
the honeymoon variable with presidential success. The null hypothesis is that whether or not the 
president is during the honeymoon phase of his presidency will have no effect on the outcomes 
of his success in executive privilege claims. I used Fisher’s exact test for this tabulation also 





















Table 2: Cross-tabulation on presidential success by honeymoon period 
 
The result for this tabulation, p = 0.025, revealed that the relationship between the 
honeymoon period and presidential success in executive privilege is statistically significant at the 





the relationship appears to go in the opposite direction than hypothesized—the results indicate 
that presidents are less likely to be successful during the honeymoon period, not more likely. 
Perhaps this a result of the skills presidents develop during their tenure. More experienced 
presidents might be able to predict more correctly when their use of executive privilege will lead 
to the outcome they want and when they should give in to Congress’s demands.  
However, we should be cautious about these results because it appears as though the 
contempt of Congress variable is interfering with the outcome. Table 3 shows the seven cases in 
which presidents were in the honeymoon period when they invoked executive privilege. 
 














































6 No No No 
Bush (2001) Yes 50.57% 
(House) 
 






0 No Yes No 
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Table 3: Executive privilege claims made during a president’s honeymoon period 
 
We should take note that of the seven cases that involved a honeymoon period, two 
involved a Supreme Court case and three involved contempt of Congress citations. It seems as 
though we cannot draw a conclusion with such a small sample size because of the overlap with 
the contempt variable. 
 In order to test whether the number of times a president has previously used executive 
privilege has an effect on his success, I cross-tabulated these two variables. The null hypothesis 
is that the number of previous uses has no effect on presidential success in executive privilege 




























Fisher’s exact test revealed that there is no statistically significant relationship, with p = 
0.843; therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis. While I hypothesized that presidents 
would be less likely to succeed when they had a higher number of previous uses of executive 
privilege because they would be seen as less trustworthy, it seems as though members of 
Congress evaluate the worthiness of a particular claim of executive privilege independently of 
any previous claims. 
 To test whether or not presidents are more successful in cases that involve a threat to 
national security, I cross-tabulated these two variables and used Fisher’s exact test to determine 
whether or not the result is statistically significant. 
 
 






















The result, p = 0.064, revealed that the relationship is only marginally significant; it does 
not meet the conventional threshold for statistical significance. However, I think that if this test 
were to be repeated with a larger sample size, the results are likely to be statistically significant. 
There do not seem to be any significant interfering variables with this result; of the seven cases 
that involved national security, three involved contempt of Congress citations: Ford (1975), 
Reagan (1981), and G. W. Bush (July 10, 2008). Of those three, one was successful (Bush, July 
10, 2008), and one was somewhat successful (Ford 1975). 
Lastly, I tabulated the success variable with the contempt of Congress variable. The null 
hypothesis is that whether or not Congress pursues a contempt citation will have no effect on 



























The p-value of 0.015 reveals that the relationship is of conventional statistical 
significance and that we can reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternate hypothesis that 
whether or not Congress pursues a contempt citation has an effect on presidential success in 
executive privilege cases. There do not seem to be any interfering variables in this result; 
because the cases are divided pretty evenly between those that did and those that did not involve 
contempt citations, each category has a fairly even dispersal of the other significant variables.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
 These findings suggest that the outcome of an executive privilege case depends on a 
range of factors that differ somewhat from the determinants of success in legislation. For 
instance, they indicate that a variable that consistently affects legislative success, party 
composition of Congress, does not affect executive privilege cases in the same way. On the other 
hand, honeymoon periods, which some studies have found to affect legislative success, were 
found to have a significant relationship with executive privilege success, although it was in the 
opposite direction than hypothesized. Whereas no studies have found that the honeymoon period 
negatively affects presidential success in legislation (Catt 2013, 45), the results from this study 
indicate that it may have a negative effect in executive privilege cases.  
Another variable that was found to be significant—whether or not Congress pursued a 
contempt citation—suggests that executive privilege outcomes are affected by the constitutional 
powers that the legislative branch is able to wield over the executive. Because claims of 
executive privilege involve a balancing act between the powers of the president and those of 
Congress, it seems as though the determinants of executive privilege are those factors that give 
either the legislative or the executive branch an edge over the other. Whereas in legislation it can 
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be assumed that the president has some common goals with members of Congress who are in his 
party, party alignments do not seem to matter much when it comes to executive privilege. 
Instead, it seems as though the result depends more on tenure (as captured by the honeymoon 
period), whether or not Congress wants to invoke its ability to cite officials for contempt, and, to 
a lesser degree, whether or not the case involves national security. 
 One limitation of this study is its small sample size. Although there have been many more  
uses of executive privilege than the 30 used in this study, information about the earlier claims is 
much more difficult to find. Future studies would benefit from the addition of more well-
documented cases. This would likely make the results for the national security variable more 
accurate, as it is probable that it has a significant effect overall, even if did not quite meet 
standards of significance in the study of these 30 cases. 
 Future studies would also benefit from having a variable that measures the significance of 
each claim to each branch or perhaps including a measure of how it is seen in the public eye. 
This seems as though it would explain why sometimes one side simply gives up and allows the 
other to prevail; presumably, this would only occur if the stakes of the case are not very high. 
Lastly, future studies could look at the difference in outcomes when deliberative process 
privilege is invoked instead of presidential communications privilege. This seems as though it 
would be an important indicator; however, it is difficult to identify a stated reason in every claim 
that was used in this study. Perhaps if there is more media coverage and better documentation of 










Appendix A: Table of Variables 1-3 









No 0 Yes: “The chairman of the subcommittee 
acquiesced to the assertion” (Garvey 2014, 24). 
Kennedy (1962) 




No 1 Yes: “. . . Kennedy used executive privilege to 
prevent legislative oversight of foreign policy” 
(Rozell 2010, 42). 
Nixon (1970) 44.14% 
(House) 
 
No 0 Yes: “The president approved an assertion of 
executive privilege by Attorney General John 
Mitchell to withhold the requested documents on 
the basis that it would not be in the public interest 
to release confidential FBI reports” (Rozell 2010, 
60). 
Nixon (1971) 44% 
(Senate) 
 
No 1 Yes: “Neither Fulbright nor the other members of 
the committee raised this difference of opinion to 
the level of a constitutional dispute” (Rozell 2010, 
60). 
Nixon (1972) 44% 
(Senate) 
 
No 2 Somewhat: “The White House and the committee 
eventually compromised on the issue, allowing 










Yes 3 No: “. . . the Court ruled that the need for 
information in this criminal case overruled the 












Yes 4 No: “. . . the Court ruled that the need for 
information in this criminal case overruled the 








No 5 No: “. . . the Court ruled that the need for 
information in this criminal case overruled the 





Ford (1975) 33.10% 
(House) 
 
No 0 Somewhat: “Eventually the administration and 
Congress reached a compromise whereby 
committee members and staff would attend an oral 
briefing on the information containing the disputed 
materials” (Rozell 2010, 82). 
Carter (1980) 63.91% 
(House) 
 
No 0 No: “The controversy was effectively ended on 13 
May 1980 when a district court voided Carter’s 
proclamation . . .” (Rozell 2010, 92). 
Reagan (1981) 44.14% 
(House) 
 
Yes 0 No: “The administration decided to resolve the 
issues in Congress’s favor and . . . made the 
contested documents available to the 
subcommittee for review” (Rozell 2010, 101). 
Reagan (1982) 44.14% 
(House) 
 
No 1 Somewhat: “. . . in an effort to put the controversy 
to rest, the White House accepted a compromise to 
release the disputed documents” (Rozell 2010, 
103). 
Reagan (1986) 53% 
(Senate) 
 
No 2 Somewhat: “The Justice Department and 
Judiciary Committee agreed on an arrangement in 
which certain documents would be reviewed by 
selected senators and staff members” (Rozell 
2010, 104). 





No 0 Yes: “the Conyers committee chose not to 
challenge Bush’s claim of executive privilege” 
(Rozell 2010, 116). 







No 0 No: “The court ultimately determined that the 
balance tipped in favor of the independent 
counsel’s need for information in a criminal 
investigation” (Rozell 2010, 130). 
Clinton (1995) 48% 
(Senate) 
 
No 1 No: “The White House ultimately produced the 
notes for the Senate Whitewater Committee and 
the 






No 2 No: “The White House . . . agreed to an 
accommodation with the committee whereby all 
remaining documents would be made available to 







No 3 Yes: “. . . Gillman and the committee ultimately 
did not pursue the matter and effectively allowed 
Clinton’s use of executive privilege to stand” 










No 4 Yes: “The Zeliff subcommittee dropped the matter 
once Congress went into recess in October” 






Yes 5 No: “ . . . the committee achieved full access to the 






Yes 6 No: “In early 1998, the committee held hearings 
on the controversy and used the disputed 
documents” (Rozell 2010, 134). 







No 7 No: “Judge Johnson ultimately ruled against 
Clinton’s use of executive privilege in the 
Lewinsky investigation” (Rozell 2010, 144). 
Clinton (1999) 48.51% 
(House) 
 
No 8 Yes: “. . . without access to these documents 
currently, it is not possible to make a firm 
determination whether the president was 
concealing embarrassing information . . . or 
whether divulging legal advice on the pardons 
would have jeopardized the lives or safety of 
individuals who had provided information to the 
government . . .” (Rozell 2010, 146). 
Bush (2001) 50.57% 
(House) 
 
Yes 0 Somewhat: “On 1 March 2002, the two sides 
reached an accommodation in which the 
committee would be permitted to openly view six 
of the ten disputed documents” (Rozell 2010, 152). 








No 1 No: “. . . the ruling was a clear defeat for President 
Bush” (Rozell 2010, 169). 





No 2 Somewhat: “. . . the parties reached an agreement 
in March 2009. The executive provided some of 
the requested documents to the committee and Ms. 
Miers was permitted to testify, under oath, in a 







No 3 Yes: “In May 2009, the Obama administration 
effectively ended the Bush policy approach . . .” 
(Rozell 2010, 185). 




part of the accommodation reached between the 
executive and the House . . .” (Garvey 2014, 27). 





No 5 Yes: “. . . the Obama Justice Department decision 
to decide with the former Bush administration 
claim of executive privilege to prevent the release 
of the transcript of the Cheney interview . . .” 
(Rozell 2010, 191-2). 
Obama (2012) 44.37% 
(House) 
 
Yes 0 No: “President Barack Obama relented Friday, 
turning over to lawmakers thousands of pages of 




























                                                


















Kennedy (1962) Yes No Yes 
Kennedy (1962) Yes No Yes 
Nixon (1970) No No Yes 
Nixon (1971) Yes No Yes 






No Court No 
Nixon (1973)—
grand jury subpoena 
[Watergate 2] 
No Court No 
Nixon (1974) 
[Watergate 3] 
No Court No 
Ford (1975) Yes Yes: “the committee cited 
Kissinger for contempt...” (Rozell 
2010, 81). 
Somewhat 
Carter (1980) No Yes: “The subcommittee voted to 
hold Duncan in contempt of 
Congress” (Rozell 2010, 92). 
No 
Reagan (1981) Yes Yes: “....the Committee on Energy 
and Commerce passed a resolution 
recommending that Watt be cited 
by the full House for contempt of 
Congress” (Rozell 2010, 101). 
No 
Reagan (1982) No Yes: “On 16 December 1982, the 
House of Representatives voted 
259-105 to find Gorsuch in 
contempt of Congress” (Rozell 
2010, 102). 
Somewhat 
Reagan (1986) No No Somewhat 
H.W. Bush (1991) No No Yes 
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Clinton (1994) No No No 
Clinton (1995) No No No 
Clinton (May 1996) No Yes: “The committee voted to hold 
Quinn and two former White 
House aides in contempt of 
Congress” (Rozell 2010, 126). 
No 
Clinton (Sept. 1996) Yes Court Yes 
Clinton (Oct. 1996) No No Yes 
Clinton (May 1997) No Yes: “Burton also called Ruff to 
testify before the committee on 15 
May 1997 ‘to explain why you 
should not be held in contempt of 
Congress’” (Rozell 2010, 139). 
No 
Clinton (Oct. 1997) No No No 
Clinton (1998) No Court No 
Clinton (1999) No No Yes 
G. W. Bush (2001) No No Somewhat 
G. W. Bush (2002) No Court No 
G. W. Bush (2007) No Yes: “The House passed contempt 
resolutions against Miers and 
Bolton on February 14, 2008” 
(Garvey 2014, 26). 
Somewhat 
G. W. Bush (June 
2008) 
No No Yes 
G. W. Bush (July 
10, 2008) 
No Yes: “On July 30, 2008, the full 
Judiciary Committee approved a 
report recommending that Mr. 
Rove be cited for contempt by the 
House” (Garvey 2014, 27). 
Somewhat 
G. W. Bush (July 
16, 2008) 
Yes Yes: “. . . the committee scheduled 
a meeting to consider a resolution 
citing him for contempt of 
Congress” (Garvey 2014, 27). 
Yes 
Obama (2012) No Yes: “. . . the committee voted to 
hold Attorney General Eric Holder 
. . . in contempt of Congress. The 
full House voted in favor of a 
criminal contempt citation on June 
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